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THE CASH DISCOUNT ACT: MORE THAN JUST
A MATTER OF SEMANTICS?
I.

INTRODUCTION

The rapid growth in availability and use of consumer credit during
the past two decades, and particularly the omnipresence of "plastic
money,"' has spawned considerable legislation governing consumer
credit practices. This comment will examine the Cash Discount Act,'
Congress' most recent decree in a series of legislative actions and
amendments concerning consumer credit protection which began with
passage of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) in 1968.
Terminology

A.

Before beginning any discussion about the Cash Discount Act, it
is necessary to define several terms which will be used throughout this
comment. Except where otherwise indicated, the definitions given below
are those used by the Office of Consumer Affairs, U.S. Department of
Commerce.'
Annual Percentage Rate (APR) - the charge for a loan or credit
purchase stated as a percentage; that is, the finance charge per dollar
per year.'
Bank Credit Card - a credit card issued by a bank to extend credit for
interest. It allows the borrower to obtain a cash loan from the bank or
to buy goods or services from the seller. (See Third-party Credit
Card.)'
Cash Discount - a reduction from the regular price allowed for a cash

1. Garcia, Credit Cards: An Interdisciplinary Survey, 6 J. CONSUMER RESEARCH 327
(1980). During the past decade, credit card use has grown at an average rate of 12.2% annually;
bank credit card growth has been even more rapid at 28.7% in part due to the advantage of
universal acceptance. Id.
2. Pub. L. No. 97-25, 95 Stat. 144 (1981) (to be codified in scattered sections of 12, 15, and
42 U.S.C.). This comment will examine Titles I and 11 of the Act. Title III includes miscellaneous
provisions which (I) clarify the effective date for civil liability provisions under the Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act, (2) allow a two year moratorium on real estate divestiture
requirements imposed upon national banks having real estate on the books at a nominal value as
of December 31, 1979, and (3) permit appointment of the Surgeon General without regard to the
existing mandatory retirement age. Title III will not be discussed further.
3. Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-14,
31-45, 61-67) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
4.

OFFICE OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS,

U.S.

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, CREDIT

ISSUES - RESPONSIVE BUSINESS APPROACHES TO CONSUMER

5.

6.

&

NEEDS, 18-19 (1981).

Id. See also infra note 28, explaining methods of calculation under TILA.
supra note 4.

OFFICE OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS,
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purchase.'
Closed-end Credit - Credit which involves scheduled payments made
over a specific period of time. (See Installment Credit.)'
Credit - the right granted by a creditor to a consumer to defer payment
for the purchase of goods or services.'
Debit Card - a bank card which substitutes for a check or cash,
whereby the consumer's bank account is debited electronically for the
amount of purchase.10
Finance Charge - the total dollar amount charged for a loan or credit
purchase, including interest and other fees."
Installment Credit - credit which is repaid in a series of payments over
time. (See Closed-end Credit.)"'
Open-end Credit - credit which allows customers to make a series of
purchases up to a set credit limit. Payment may be made in full each
month or on only a portion of the balance. (Also called Revolving
13
Credit.)
Surcharge - any means of increasing the regular price to a credit cardholder which is not imposed on customers paying by cash, check, or
1
other similar means. '
Third-party Credit Card - a credit card issued by a creditor other than
the merchant. (Examples of Third-party Credit Cards are Visa, MasterCard, American Express, Diners' Club.)1"
B.

Characteristicsof Credit Use

Much of the research on consumer credit has examined who uses
credit and credit cards. 1 Studies have shown that the most frequent
users of all types of consumer credit are young married families with
children.1 7 Credit card use tends to increase with income, education,

7. Id. See also IS U.S.C. § 1603(p). For example, if a merchant offers a 10% cash discount
on an item which normally sells for $10.00, a cash paying customer could purchase the item for
$9.00.
8.

OFFICE OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS, supra note 4.

9. Id.
10. Id.
II. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.

14. See 15 U.S.C. § 1603(q). For example, if a merchant imposed a 10% surcharge on an
item which normally sells for $ 10.00, a credit card customer would pay $11.00 for that item, while
a cash paying customer could purchase that item for $10.00.
15. OFFICE OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS, supra note 4.
16. Garcia, supra note 1, at 328.
17. REPORT OF NATIONAL COMM'N ON CONSUMER FINANCE, CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE
UNITED STATES 12 (1972) [hereinafter cited as CONSUMER CREDIT REPORT].
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and social class, but decreases significantly among retirees.' The research on causes of credit use is essentially descriptive in nature."
Reasons generally advanced for the use of credit cards include such
things as convenience as a medium of exchange and simplicity as a
source of short-term revolving credit which allows deferred payments.20
Cardholders in the lower income or socioeconomic groups use credit
cards to generate revolving credit; higher income groups use cards for
convenience.' 1 The lower income consumers tend to substitute credit
cards for cash more frequently and use credit for 'durable' and 'necessary' goods; higher income groups use credit for 'luxury' items." In
general, increased urbanization of the population, age, attitude (willingness to incur debt), and increases in the purchase of durable consumer goods have contributed to the upsurge in reliance on consumer
credit.'
It has been estimated that forty percent of the residents of this
country hold a bank credit card and more than half hold at least one
major oil company credit card, although active use of these accounts
varies regionally." The value of goods and services purchased on bank
credit cards in 1977 was $37.6 billion, representing 3%of all consumer
expenditures; purchases made on all types of consumer credit cards
represented 8% of consumer expenditures. 5
In the Day-Brandt study of consumers who made major purchases,
43% used cash." Of those who used credit, 28% had cash available for
the purchase but chose to use credit instead of paying cash. Assuming
all those who used cash also had a choice (i.e. could have obtained
credit), almost 60% of the buyers in the study could choose between
cash and credit.' 7 The Cash Discount Act is aimed toward encouraging
these consumers to use cash and rely less on consumer credit.
II. PRECEDING CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION
As originally enacted, the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) required

creditors to inform consumers of credit terms, including the finance
18. Garcia, supra note 1,at 328. See also

CONSUMER CREDIT REPORT, supra

note 17, at

12.
i9. Garcia, supra note i, at 328.
20. Id. at 329. See also Plummer, Life Style Patterns and Commercial Bank Credit Card
Usage. J. MARKETING, Apr. 1971, at 35.
21. Garcia, supra note 1, at 329.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Plummer, supra note 20, at 35.
CONSUMER CREDIT REPORT, supra note 17, at

5-7.

Melso v. Texaco, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 1280, 1288 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
Garcia, supra note 1, at 328.

26.

CONSUMER CREDIT REPORT,

27.

Id.
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charge, annual percentage rate (APR), 18 and total transaction cost.' 9
The underlying assumptions of TILA were that standardized disclosure
of the APR and finance charge would improve consumer knowledge
and understanding and lead to more informed, and cost-effective use of
credit through comparison of terms, 0 and availability of a common
denominator.' 1
TILA had three functions: descriptive, shopping, and economic
stabilization."3 The descriptive function was intended to help consumers
make more informed choices regarding the use of cash versus credit
and versus postponement of the purchase." The shopping function
would enable consumers to seek credit under the most favorable
terms."s It was also anticipated that TILA would contribute to economic stability by preventing overindebtedness leading to bankruptcy
and by reducing credit use in general, thereby avoiding the inflationary
effects of credit use.' 6 TILA made a useful contribution to consumer
credit protection by providing standardized information to compare
credit costs." This does not mean the consumer will always select the
lower rate, but he will have the time-rate information available as a
basis for his decision.87
The Day-Brandt study revealed that as a result of TILA, between
one and three percent of all buyers would not use credit in the future
once they learned the true cost of credit.u However, the study concluded there was no evidence that overall credit use was significantly
influenced by disclosure of the APR and finance charge.' 9 Further-

28. TILA requires calculation of the APR according to the actuarial method. It is the true
annual rate of the finance charge computed on the declining unpaid balance of the amount
financed. An alternative to this, called the add-on method, is calculated on the initial amount
financed. The add-on method is not permitted for TILA purposes because it is misleading. An
APR computed on the declining balance is approximately twice the simple add-on rate. For example, 9.1% add-on interest over 12 months is equivalent to 18% APR under the actuarial method
for 12 months. Id. at 169; Comment, Legal Problems of Consumer Credit: Consumer Credit Sale
Disclosure in California. 4 U.C.D. L. REV. 123, 164 (1971).
29. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601(a), 1605, 1606.
30.
SUMER

1 NATIONAL COMM'N ON CONSUMER FINANCE, TECHNICAL STUDIES, A STUDY OF CONDECISIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR PRESENT AND PROSPECTIVE LEGISLATION, 2, 43

CREDIT

(Day & Brandt 1972) [hereinafter cited as Day & Brandt].
31. Mandell, Consumer Perception of Incurred Interest Rates: An Empirical Test of the
Efficacy of the Truth-In-Lending Law, 26 J. FIN. 1143 (1971).
32. CONSUMER CREDIT REPORT, supra note 17, at 171-74.
33. Id. at 172.
34. Id.

35. Id. at 174.
36. Day & Brandt, supra note 30, at 61.
37. CONSUMER CREDIT REPORT, supra note 17, at 172.
38. Day & Brandt, supra note 30, at 71.
39. Id. at 73. See generally Mandell, supra note 31, at 1153;
supra note 17, at 175-77, 182-84.
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more, the decision to use credit was found to be highly sensitive to
situational variables such as availability of cash, price of the goods or
services, previous credit buying experience, and size of the monthly
payment.40
TILA created legal impediments for a merchant who wished to
offer cash discounts to reduce the costs incident to extending consumer
credit. Under the strict disclosure requirements, any difference between
the price of a cash purchase and a credit transaction was considered a
finance charge, and as such, inclusion in the calculation of the APR
41
and disclosure to the consumer as a cost of credit were necessary.
This requirement effectively precluded a cash discount because the required disclosure is generally made by an open-end creditor when an
account is opened and on periodic (monthly) billing statements, rather
than at the time of the purchase." Difficulties in compliance are further complicated in cases in which the finance charge and APR are
calculated by a third-party creditor instead of by the merchant." In
addition, merchants or other creditors already charging the maximum
finance rate in the state where the purchase was made would risk exceeding the state usury ceiling when a cash discount was reflected as an
additional cost of credit."
Congress first eased the stringent requirements of TILA pertaining
to cash discounts when it enacted the Fair Credit Billing Act of 1974.46
This legislation modified TILA by declaring that a cash discount not
exceeding 5%would not constitute a finance charge, providing such discount was offered to all prospective buyers and its availability was
clearly and conspicuously disclosed. 46 This discount was limited to
open-end or revolving credit plans that involved the issuance of a credit
card; a discount would not be excluded from finance charge and APR
calculations when offered in conjunction with installment credit
terms. 47 The 5%ceiling was imposed to prevent merchants from passing along to the cash customer a savings greater than the amount a
merchant would otherwise pay a third-party creditor if the purchase

40. Day & Brandt, supra note 30, at 73, 100.
41. S. REP. No. 23, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 74.
42. Lobel] & Gelb, Consumer Credit, 186 N.Y.L.J. 125 (1981).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Pub. L. No. 93-495, 88 Stat. 1511 (1974) (codified as amended as 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601,
1602, 1610, 1631, 1632, 1637, 1666-1666(j)) (1976 & Supp. I1 1979).
46. S. REP. No. 23, 97th Cong., ist Sess. 2, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 74, 75.
47. Lobell & Gelb, supra note 42.
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were made with a bank credit card.' 8 The amount of the discount was
set at approximately the same amount as the merchant processing or
discount fee imposed by a third-party credit card issuer on participating member merchants. In practice, however, the merchant discount
fee varies among merchants and banks and is established on a contractual basis between the member merchant and servicing bank. '" Despite
congressional approval for merchants to offer limited cash discounts,
many merchants were reluctant to do so.' 0 The Federal Reserve Board
itself has acknowledged that the complicated regulatory requirements
imposed under Regulation Z were probably a significant factor in discouraging widespread use of cash discounts.' 1 These regulations required extensive advertising and posting of the availability of cash discounts; merchants were unwilling to risk exposure to civil liability
2
provisions for noncompliance.'
In the Fair Credit Billing Act, Congress created an ambiguity
which was discovered by the Federal Reserve Board as it was preparing
the implementing regulations for the limited discount provision. The
Federal Reserve Board found it unclear whether Congress intended to
permit any type of two-tier pricing system resulting in a lower price for
cash customers, or only a discount from the tagged price.' 3 In other
words, how was discount to be defined? Did Congress intend to permit
surcharges to be imposed on credit transactions?" Congress resolved
these questions on February 27, 1976, when it passed an amendment to
48. S. REP. No. 23, 97th Cong., Ist Ses. 11, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 74, 84.
49. Most explanations of bank credit card systems describe three contractual agreements:
one between the bank and participating merchant whereby the merchant agrees to accept the
credit card and bank agrees to process and make collection on all receipts at a negotiated discount
rate; a second between the bank and the cardholder which covers terms of credit; and a third
between the retail merchant and cardholder when payment for goods or services is made with the
credit card. See United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 411 n.2 (1974); Davenport, Bank Credit
Cards and the Uniform Commercial Code, I VAL. U. L. REV. 218, 224-25 (1967); Comment, The
Tripartite Credit Card Transaction:A Legal Infant, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 459 (1960); Comment,
Bank Credit Cards - Contemporary Problems, 41 FORDHAM L. REV. 373, 374 (1972). A Tenth
Circuit case describes another contract between member banks in the intercharge processing system, establishing the mechanism for clearing authorizations and processing receipts to the issuing
bank to be charged against the cardholder's account. Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank v. United
States, 505 F.2d 1185, 1187 (10th Cir. 1974).
50. S. REP. No. 23, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 3, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 74, 76.
51. Id. See also Regulation Z. 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(i) (1980) (rescinded 1981).
52. Lobell & Gelb, supra note 42. The civil liabilities were set at $100 minimum statutory
damages, plus attorney's fees in an individual action; up to the lesser of $500,000 or 1% of
merchant's net worth, plus attorney's fees in a class action.
53. S. REP. No. 23, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 2, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 74, 75.
54. Id.
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TILA (including the Fair Credit Billing Act) specifically prohibiting
the imposition of surcharges on credit customers.15 This surcharge ban,
which was due to expire in February 1979, was extended for an additional two years, through February 27, 1981, as part of the Financial
Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978." In
1980, the 96th Congress considered, but did not enact, legislation
which would have removed the ceiling on cash discounts and further
extended the surcharge ban.57 The 97th Congress House and Senate
banking committees thus recognized the need to act promptly if the
surcharge ban was to be retained beyond the February 1981 sunset
date.
The Cash Discount Act was introduced in the House by Congressman Frank Annunzio (D-Ill.) as H.R. 31 and in the Senate by Senator
John Chafee (R-R.I.) as S. 414.58 Both bills contained a three-year
extension on the surcharge ban and additionally contained provisions
removing the ceiling on cash discounts.5 9
III.
A.

THE CASH DISCOUNT ACT - PROVISIONS

Title I - Removing the Discount Ceiling

Title I of the Cash Discount Act removes several impediments to
the offering of cash discounts. Section 101 provides that "any discount
from the regularprice offered by a seller for the purpose of inducing
payment by cash, check, or other means not involving the use of an
open-end credit plan or credit card shall not constitute a finance
charge. . .[providing] the discount is offered to all prospective buyers,
and its availability is disclosed clearly and conspicuously."" The obvious impact of this section is to amend the portion of TILA limiting a
cash discount to 5%. However, the comprehensive effect of this amendment is more clearly delineated in section 102, in which Congress defines the term "regular price."
[Riegular price means the tag or posted price charged for the property
or service if a single price is tagged or posted, or the price charged ...

55. Act of February 27, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-222, 90 Stat. 197 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §
1666(0) (Supp. I1 1979).
56. Pub. L. No. 95-630, § 1501, 92 Stat. 3641, 3713 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1666(0)
(Supp. I1 1979).
57. S. REP. No. 23, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 2, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 74, 75. The House passed a bill, but provisions to permit unlimited cash discounts and
prohibit surcharges were never considered by the Senate because they were part of a more comprehensive bill which was not enacted.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Cash Discount Act § 101 (emphasis added).
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when payment is made by use of an open-end credit plan or charge card
if either (1) no price is tagged or posted, or (2) two prices are tagged or
posted, one of which is charged when payment is made by use of an
open-end credit plan or credit card and the other when payment is made
by cash, check, or similar means. s
This definition distinguishes clearly between cash discounts, which are
permitted, and surcharges, which are not permitted.2 Section 103 further enhances the practical aspects of offering a cash discount by nullifying all Federal Reserve System rules and regulations pertaining to
cash discounts which were in effect on July 27, 1981, the day prior to
the effective date of this Act."s
B.

Title 1I - Extending the Surcharge Ban

The most compelling reason for passage of the Cash Discount Act
is found in section 201. This section extends, until February 27, 1984,
the earlier provisions of the public law which prohibited merchants
from imposing a surcharge on customers who choose to use a credit
card rather than pay cash." This provision was the subject of considerable congressional debate and testimony before congressional
subcommittees."
The paucity of conclusive evidence on the wisdom of prohibiting
surcharges resulted in a legislative mandate for a two-year study by the
Federal Reserve System to ascertain the effect of charge card transactions upon card issuers, merchants, and consumers." The findings
should address
(1) the effect of charge card transactions on retail sales; (2) the effect of
credit card usage on consumers and on merchants, including the effects
on merchant costs; and (3) the effect of charge card usage on the pricing
of goods and services, with a comparison of the costs resulting from payment by (a) currency and coin, (b) by personal check or similar instrument, (c) by in-house credit plans, and (d) by charge card.6 7

IV.
A.

ANALYSIS

A Closer Look at Title I - The PracticalEffects
Despite its straightforward language and regulatory simplicity, the
61. Id. § 102(a).
62. See supra notes 7 & 14 and accompanying text.
63. Cash Discount Act § 103. See also supra note 51.
64. Cash Discount Act § 201.
65. See infra text accompanying notes 88-127.
66. Cash Discount Act § 202. See also S. REP. No. 23, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 4, reprinted in

1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 74, 77.

67.

Cash Discount Act § 202.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol8/iss1/6

1982]

COMMENTS

essence of Title I - removal of the 5% ceiling on cash discounts-has
one apparent flaw. Because an unlimited discount (even a 5%discount)
can have a substantial impact on the APR for a credit transaction, the
credit consumer is now even more frustrated in his attempt to make
meaningful cost comparisons, thus circumventing the original purpose
of TILA: consumer protection through standardized disclosure of credit
costs." Nancy H. Teeters, a member of the Federal Reserve Board,
called this the "loophole in the blanket embrace of TILA.""
At the same time, the removal of the 5%ceiling creates a greater
incentive for customers to pay cash. James L. Kittle, a retail merchant
representing the National Home Furnishings Association, testified
before a Senate subcommittee that customers have little incentive to
pay cash when credit is so readily available; the 5%discount was not a
sufficient inducement for customers to pay cash, particularly when the
prime lending rate was 17%. 70 The amount of a cash discount must be
flexible and realistically reflect the current money market. Many of the
consumers who can afford to pay cash are well informed about the time
value of money and are thus inclined to take advantage of credit
"float" by allowing their cash on deposit to draw interest and then paying off the full monthly balance on the charge account to avoid paying
interest to the creditor. 7 ' Float, the credit outstanding between the time
the bank pays the merchant and the credit cardholder pays the bank
without incurring interest on the balance due, can often be as long as
45-55 days.72 At the time of Senator Proxmire's statement, float was
running between $4-5 billion at any given time.73 To reduce float, some
creditors now charge interest from the date the purchase is posted to
the cardholders account, effectively eliminating what is essentially a
74
short-term interest free loan.
The definition of regular price is the cornerstone of the Cash Discount Act because it establishes a benchmark. The definition requires a
merchant to tag or post the highest price charged for all goods and/or

68. S. REP. No. 23, 97th Cong., IstSess. 1I, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 74, 84.
69. Cash Discount Act, 1981: Hearings on S. 414 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 10
(1981) (statement of Nancy H. Teeters, Member, Federal Reserve Board) [hereinafter cited as
Senate Hearings].
70. Id. at 25-26 (statement of James L. Kittle, representing National Home Furnishings
Association).
71. 127 CONG. REC. S2097 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1981) (statement of Sen. Proxmire).
72. Melso v. Texaco, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 1280, 1289 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
73. 127 CONG. REC. S2097 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1981).
74. Melso. 532 F. Supp. at 1290.
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services.78 A merchant is not prohibited from posting more than one
price, but the language of the Act precludes the possibility of a
merchant posting or tagging only the lower, or discount price. Thus, a
consumer cannot be lured into a store on the basis of "low, rock-bottom
prices" only to find at the cash register that the price will be higher if a
credit card is used. 7 " The consumer must see at least the highest possible price he will pay if he uses a credit card. The possibility of a
merchant posting only the lower cash price is also effectively precluded
by the surcharge ban.77 The merchant may choose the manner or
method for tagging or posting prices, providing it does not mislead the
78
consumer.
The definition of regular price provides that payment by cash,
check, draft, or other negotiable instrument, which may result in the
debiting of a credit-type account, shall not be considered a credit transaction for purposes of the Cash Discount Act.7 9 For example, the Official Commentary specifically allows merchants the flexibility to selectively offer a discount to customers who pay with currency, but not to
those who pay by check or debit card.8 0 The Official Commentary also
sanctions a graduated discount plan where a merchant might offer a
10% discount for cash, a 5% discount for use of a third party credit
card, and no discount for use of an in-house credit card in order to
discourage the use of the in-house credit plan." Thus, a merchant also
has flexibility in determining which method of payment will qualify for
a discount and at what rate.
The significance of the language "all prospective buyers" must not
be overlooked. When a discount is offered, the discount must be available to prospective buyers regardless of whether they are cardholders or
members of the open-end credit plan.8 This phrase thus insures that
customers who do not have credit cards can still reap the benefits of a
cash discount even though they would have paid cash anyway. This
does not, however, preclude offering discounts to members of special

See supra text accompanying
S. REP. No. 23, 97th Cong.,
NEWS 74, 77.
77. See supra text accompanying
78. S. REP. No. 23, 97th Cong.,
75.
76.

notes 61-62.
Ist Sess. 4, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
notes 14 & 64.
Ist Sess. 4, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.

NEWS 74, 77.

79. Cash Discount Act § 102(a).
80. Federal Reserve Board, Official Staff Commentary 104 § 226.4, 4(b)(9)(2), Report No.
343 (Oct. 21, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Official Staff Commentary]. See also Lobell & Gelb,
supra note 42.
81. Official Staff Commentary, supra note 80. See also Lobell & Gelb, supra note 42.
82. Lobell & Gelb. supra note 42.
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groups such as senior citizens. 83

Section 103, which nullifies the Regulation Z provisions," is also
an extremely important part of the Cash Discount Act because each
merchant is now "free to determine what [method] of disclosure best
suits his or her purpose, so long as a good faith effort [is] made to
clearly and conspicuously [advise the customer about] the availability
of cash discounts." 85 This should substantially reduce merchant reluctance to participate caused by a fear of inadvertent violation." It would

not be unreasonable to expect the courts and regulatory agencies to
enforce the requirement of clear and conspicuous notice with some
latitude.0 7
B.

A Closer Look at Title II - The Irony and the Controversy

Title II is clearly the most controversial part of this legislation. A
closer look at Title II reveals what Senator Proxmire terms the "delicious irony": at a time when the Administration has placed considerable emphasis on reducing government regulation, the Cash Discount
Act calls for increased restriction of the free enterprise system." TILA
and its progeny were enacted ostensibly to promote consumer protection, but under Title II, the Cash Discount Act affords substantial continuing protection to the credit card industry by extending the ban on
credit card surcharges. The result, according to Senator Proxmire, is
inflationary because it ultimately encourages credit and discourages
cash purchases.8 9 Consumers should be able to make informed choices,
however, this ban on surcharges "promotes costly economic inefficiencies by encouraging [consumers] to use credit cards without knowing
the true cost of the credit card.""
The advantages and disadvantages of the credit card surcharge
have been discussed in Congress three times in the six years from 1976
to 1981. Senator Proxmire is not alone in his belief that the ban on
surcharges should have been allowed to expire permanently. Prior to
passage of the Act, the Senate Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs
heard testimony from the Federal Reserve Board, Consumer Federa-

83. Id.
84. 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(i) (1980) (rescinded 1981). See supra text accompanying notes 5052, 63.
85. S. REP. No. 23, 97th Cong.. Ist Sess. 3, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 74, 76.
86. See supra text accompanying notes 50-52.
87. S. REP. No. 23, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 3, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 74, 76.

88. Id. at 8, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 74, 80.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 9, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 74, 83.
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tion of America, and Consumers Union calling for an end to the
surcharge ban." The Federal Trade Commission," the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board, 9" the Comptroller of the Currency, and the National
Credit Union Administration also opposed the surcharge ban. In addition, Proxmire's position (and the proposed Proxmire-Glenn amendment to allow surcharges) found support from labor, farm, and senior
citizen groups."
Senator Dodd, however, points out that the sum of special interest
groups does not always equal the national interest. 95 Senator Inouye
and others have spoken in favor of the ban on surcharges because a
credit card surcharge would discriminate against middle income Americans, penalizing those who rely on credit. In addition to having a chilling effect on credit use, surcharges would also reduce the benefits to
the cardholder." Congressman Annunzio fears that if the consumer
had to pay an added charge every time he or she used a credit card, the
results would be "catastrophic. ' ' 97 Senator D'Amato called it "counter91. Id.
92. Then-Chairman Michael Pertschuk wrote:
We understand from our staff that many small merchants which adopt programs to ensure
that cash customers do not pay the costs associated with accepting credit cards do so by
imposing a surcharge rather than granting a discount. In instances in which the staff has
notified these merchants that surcharges are illegal, the uniform response has been to abandon the surcharge, but not to institute cash discounts. Moreover, in at least one instance,
the merchant orally expressed his dismay that the law allowed him to raise his cash price
and then grant a discount but not to take the much simpler step of simply imposing a
surcharge.
In theory, a discount and a surcharge are equivalent concepts, but one is hidden in the
cash price and the other is not. From a practical standpoint the surcharge seems easier to
implement and more likely to ensure that the price credit card users pay reflects the cost of
accepting credit cards. If the goal of this legislation is to ensure that cash customers are
not required to absorb the extra costs of accepting credit cards, and thereby subsidize
credit card users, then elimination of the current prohibition on surcharges would seem to
be one of the most effective methods of obtaining this goal.
Id. at 10-11, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 74, 83.
93. John Dalton, writing for the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, stated that
the actual difference between a discount and a surcharge is unclear[;j . . . it [is) anamoous to allow one and not the other. The practical consequence of imposing this artificial
distinction undoubtedly would be to discourage the use of discounts, for merchants would
be confused as to what is or what is not allowed, and thus would be reluctant to engage in
any alteration of their pricing structure.
Id. at 15, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 74, 87.
94. 127 CONG. REC. S2096 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1981) (remarks of Sen. Proxmire).
95. Id. at S2098 (statement of Sen. Dodd). (Sen. Dodd is not clearly opposed to a
surcharge, but supports the Federal Reserve Board study before a final decision can be made).
96. Id. at 52095 (remarks of Sen. Inouye).
97. Cash Discount Act, 1981: Hearings on H.R. 31 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer
Affairs and Coinage of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong.,
Ist Sess. I (1981) (opening statement of Rep. Annunzio) (hereinafter cited as House Hearings).
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productive.""8 Amy Topiel, testifying on behalf of MasterCard International, Inc., said that a surcharge would give merchants an opportunity
to make windfall profits, while offering no additional benefit to cash or
credit consumers." Mr. Kittle, speaking as a merchant, said he personally would not use a surcharge even if it were allowed because it would
be a disincentive for his credit customers who represent 40% of his business. 100 Curiously, as the debates and hearings were taking place, one
astute merchant, a restaurateur in Vermont, did impose a surcharge
during the interim between the February 27, 1981 expiration of the
surcharge ban and the enactment of the Cash Discount Act. The reaction was a letter from a customer to the President of Visa calling this a
questionably illegal, and definitely immoral, practice.101 In his letter,
the customer stated that he was informed of the surcharge after he and
his guests had finished their meals; the policy was not posted anywhere
in the restaurant. He avoided an unpleasant confrontation, but was less
generous than usual when he tipped the waitress.10 ' According to Hugh
Smith, as his remarks were interpreted by Senator Chafee, the ban on
surcharges is a consumer protection device-"protecting the consumer
who has a card from being had. 108
At the heart of the surcharge debate is the question of whether, or
to what extent, the cash customer subsidizes the credit card customer.
In 1980, the three major credit card issuers, MasterCard, Visa, and
American Express, collectively earned in excess of $1.5 billion from
domestic activities through the merchant discount fee.104 The proponents of a surcharge believe that these fees are passed along to all customers in the form of higher prices because the merchant does not
know who will pay cash or use credit, and therefore, bases his price on
the assumed use of credit; the result is that both the cash and credit
customers pay this "hidden fee." 0 ' Two commentators'" have suggested that subsidization also occurs when credit consumers receive an
implicit discount by taking advantage of credit float. The cost of credit

98. 127 CONG. REC. S2101 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1981) (statement of Sen. D'Amato).
99. Senate Hearings, supra note 69, at 56 (statement of Amy Topiel).
100. Id. at 28 (statement of James L. Kittle).
101. 127 CONG. REc. S2089-90 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1981) (Harrison letter of Mar. 2, 1981,
introduced by Sen. Garn).
102. Id. at S2089.
103. Senate Hearings, supra note 69, at 58-59 (emphasis added) (dialogue between Hugh
Smith and Sen. Chafee).
104. S. REP. No. 23, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
N Ews 74, 81.
105. Id. See generally Melso, 532 F. Supp. at 1288-89.
106. Murphy & Ott, Retail Credit. Credit Cards and Price Discrimination, 43 So. ECON.
J. 1303, 1311 (1977).
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plans must include not only direct operating expenses, but also the lost
interest.10 7 This is a strong argument to show that price discrimination
exists, but cash discounts would appear to be an equally effective
method of overcoming this inequity. Subsidy has also been examined
from the perspective that the lower income consumer who uses credit
cards as a source of revolving credit subsidizes the higher income consumer who pays his bill in full and avoids interest, but this is disputed
because the cost of providing credit (especially the probability of default) differs among income groups.10a
Senator Chafee, on the other hand, raises the question of how the
$1.5 billion in fees compares to the costs of doing business inherent in
other forms of payment. 10 ' According to Richard D'Agostino, speaking
on behalf of the American Bankers Association, credit cards may in
fact be a more efficient and less expensive way of doing business.110
Peter Hood, also testifying for the American Bankers Association, echoes Mr. D'Agostino's sentiments: the basic premise, that the cost of
doing business with a credit card is more expensive for the merchant
than other forms of payment, is not the case in his experience. " Hugh
Smith's testimony is even more decisive.
The central premise behind credit card surcharges-that the service fee

paid to a card issuer is a direct, additional, and irrecoverable cost to
merchants which is passed along to all customers in the form of higher
prices-is superficial and fallacious. We know it is not supported by em11
pirical data. 2

Id. at 1303.
108. Garcia, supra note I, at 329.
109. 127 CONG. REC. S2084 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1981) (statement of Sen. Chafee). The
other costs might include counterfeit currency, additional security requirements due to increased
cash on hand, bad check losses and collection fees, fraud, and costs related to in-house credit plans
such as credit applications, investigations, collection of accounts, bad debts. See generally Senate
Hearings, supra note 69, at 32 (statement of Peter Hood, American Bankers Association).
110. House Hearings, supra note 97, at 15 (statement of Richard D'Agostinos' American
Bankers Association).
I l1. Senate Hearings, supra note 69, at 31 (statement of Peter Hood).
112. Id. at 43 (statement of Hugh Smith, American Express Co.). Mr. Smith asked to have
relevant parts of the 1968 Federal Reserve Board study titled "Bank-Credit Card and CheckCredit Card Plans" reprinted in the subcommittee report. Id. at 65. In this study, the task group
concluded that
bank credit cards are likely to have little or no direct effect on the prices of goods or
services in stores where they are accepted. They would not necessarily result in any increase in operating expenses and would likely reduce them. What little evidence there is
suggests that credit cards tended to reduce the costs to small merchants . . . and there is
no evidence that they have pressed merchants in general to raise prices. All in all, credit
cards should have little influence on retail prices and therefore on the cash customer.
id. at 87-88.
107.
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Brandel and Leonard'" point out that a credit card system must be
highly efficient (ie. low cost per transaction) in order to exist. Thirdparty credit card systems are economically advantageous for everyone
because only one credit investigation is necessary, there is only one billing per cycle for purchases involving multiple merchants, and highly
automated data systems are used in processing transactions."'
Ten years ago it was predicted that bank credit cards would lower
retail costs to the benefit of everyone." 8 Today it is argued that they
have. The use of credit cards has been perpetuated as a way of life."'
In order to remain competitive, a merchant must offer credit. In doing
so, the merchant may increase his volume of business, which in turn
could result in lower unit costs." 7 Garcia discusses the question of
whether consumer credit stimulates consumption, concluding that this
question remains a subject for future research." 8 This conclusion is
based on Russell's theoretical model of optimum allocation of lifetime
income over time and Hirschman's empirical study which suggests that
credit cards raise, rather than merely redistribute, customer expenditures over time. Both theories Garcia finds unconvincing. ' 9 Hirschman's theory is that the use of credit cards may stimulate increased
purchasing on the part of the cardholder thereby resulting in a higher
level of dollar expenditures and sales volume. This occurs because
credit card systems permit the individual to make purchases on the basis of anticipated future income. Since most people anticipate higher
future incomes, credit card expenditures may exceed cash purchases."20
It is not surprising in light of the controversy over the surcharge/
subsidy issue that Congress should be skeptical. As Senator Dodd indicated, "[a] thorough, objective analysis by the Federal Reserve System
[as required by section 202]. . . is essential if we are to eventually resolve the debate over whether or not credit surcharges are in our national interest."' 2 In fact, very little concrete information has been
presented to refute or substantiate the theory that as a result of the

113. Brandel & Leonard, Bank Charge Cards: New Cash or New Credit. 69 MICH. L. REV.
1033, 1036 (1971).
114. Id.at 1037.
115. Id.at 1039-40.
116. See Garcia, supra note 1; Senate Hearings, supra note 69, at 60 (remarks of Hugh
Smith).
117. Senate Hearings, supra note 69, at 42-43; House Hearings, supra note 97, at 23-25
(statements of Hugh Smith). See also Garcia, supra note 1, at 329.
118. Garcia, supra note 1, at 333.
119. Id.
120. Hirschman, Differences in Consumer Purchase Behavior by Credit Card Payment System, 6 J. CONSUMER RESEARCH 58, 60 (1979).
121. S. REP. No. 23, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 16, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 74, 88.
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surcharge ban, cash customers subsidize credit customers.' According
to Senator Chafee, extension of the surcharge ban is not an avoidance
of the issue, but rather constitutes a maintenance of the status quo.1 3
In the interim, the effect of allowing unlimited cash discounts can be
ascertained. To allow a surcharge now would presuppose the outcome
of the Federal Reserve Board study.? 4 Senator Hayakawa expressed a
similar opinion that Congress should rely on facts, not conjecture." 5
Until the results of the Federal Reserve Board study are known, Congress cannot determine whether it has gone far enough by allowing unlimited discounts or should go further and allow a surcharge."2 Congressman Annunzio believes retaining the surcharge ban in the interim
will create greater economic stability by avoiding inconsistent
7
policies."
C.

Who Really Benefits?

Major portions of the Cash Discount Act, particularly Title I, are
predominantly beneficial to the merchant. He may offer a cash discount in any amount, select the method of payment which will qualify
for the discount, establish a graduated rate if he so chooses, and disclose the availability of a cash discount in good faith in the manner
which is most suitable for his purpose or circumstances, all without the
intimidating constraint of Regulation Z. Or he may choose not to offer
a discount at all. If he offers a discount, he may, as a result, attract
new customers, increase his sales volume while reducing his credit related expenses, and improve his cash flow. According to Mr. Kittle, for
merchants with large amounts of money tied up in inventory, cash flow
can be a constant problem. A reasonable incentive to increase cash
sales will have an immediate beneficial effect on business and the economy as a whole."'
The consumer will benefit through lower prices for cash customers,
and he will benefit because a merchant is prohibited from conditioning
the discount on possession of a credit card, posting deceptively low
prices to entice unsuspecting buyers into his place of business, or imposing a surcharge on a customer who uses credit. The surcharge ban
may not be a benefit per se for the cash customer, but neither is it a
disincentive. Clearly, however, it is a benefit to the credit customer

122. Id. at 4, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 74, 77.
123. 127 CONG. REC. S2084 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1981) (statement of Sen. Chafee).
124. Id.
125. Id. at S2102 (remarks of Sen. Hayakawa).
126. Id.
127. Id. at H1729 (daily ed. May 4, 1981) (statement of Rep. Annunzio).
128. Senate Hearings. supra note 69, at 26 (statement of James L. Kittle).
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since an additional charge will not be added on to the cost of his
purchase. This is an admittedly simplified analysis in that it does not
consider the argument that credit causes higher prices because of the
results in lower prices behidden costs nor the argument that credit
1 9
2
volume.
sales
greater
cause it generates
Under the Cash Discount Act, if credit customers start paying
cash to take advantage of cash discounts, this will diminish the
merchant discount fees collected by the third-party credit card issuers.
While this was at one time a more prevalent concern, s° in all
probability, it is not a significant drawback today because the industry
relies more heavily on interest income on outstanding debts as a prisource of revenue; discount fees tend to be a break-even activmary
ity. 13 ' Presumably, many of the customers who will respond to the new
incentive to pay cash are those who pay off their account in full each
month and thus do not represent the primary source of revenue to the
card issuer.' 32 The Title II surcharge prohibition is undoubtedly advantageous to the credit card industry by allowing it to retain a favorable
market image. 138 Industry representatives claim that this governmental
restriction is also in the public interest.'" Many uninformed credit
card users continue to presume third-party credit service, provided to
and by merchants, is "free". If the credit customer had to pay a
surcharge to reimburse the merchant for the amount of the discount
fee, he might well be motivated to purchase less on credit. But he
might well be motivated to purchase less, period. The negative statement about credit cards, which the surcharge would inflict, would result in a lower volume of sales and would destroy any "economies of
scale" benefits. 6 Hirschman and others have found that in making a
credit purchase, the consumer had to decide not only to use credit, but
which type to use. Hirschman suggests the choice might be influenced
by five factors: (1) characteristics of the individual, such as age, income; (2) characteristics of the credit card system, such as interest
rates, prestige, line of credit available; (3) characteristics of the goods
or services being purchased, such as price; (4) policies of the merchant
regarding acceptable payment systems; and (5) characteristics of the

129.

See generally supra text accompanying notes 105, 115-20.

130. See generally Murphy & Ott, supra note 106, at n.9-10 and accompanying text;
O'Driscoll, infra note 146, at 166-68.
131.

Senate Hearings, supra note 69, at 63-64.

132. See generally supra text accompanying notes 26-27.
133. See Senate Hearings, supra note 69, at 32 (statement of Peter Hood); House Hearings, supra note 97, at 27 (statement of Hugh Smith).
134. Senate Hearings. supra note 69, at 44 (statement of Hugh Smith). Id. at 56 (statement of Amy Topiel).
135. Id. at 32 (statement of Peter Hood).
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situation, such as time, amount of debt outstanding, necessity of the
purchase, or ability to postpone the purchase.' 3 These five factors are
consistent with the Day-Brandt situational variables. 137 Although correlation may be speculative, factor four, policies of the merchant,
might, in the future, include whether the merchant imposes a
surcharge, and might influence factor five, necessity of the purchase,
leading to postponement of the purchase or no purchase at all.
Despite the fact that Congress has eased the restriction in an effort
to encourage cash discounts, the bottom line still presents a curious
dichotomy. The benefit to the cash customer is enjoyed only if the
merchant is responsive. If the merchant offers the discount, the credit
customer may not fully appreciate the consequential impact on his true
cost of credit or may not be able to make an informed choice.'" This
raises two questions. What are the alternatives? How can this be reconciled with the Truth in Lending Act?
The alternatives to the provisions of the Cash Discount Act would
be either to allow merchants to utilize both discounts and surcharges,
or to allow a surcharge, but not a cash discount. Offering a cash discount and/or imposing a surcharge would permit the greatest degree of
freedom in the free enterprise system. In the competitive marketplace,
merchants could determine whether discounts or surcharges are best
suited to their needs. It would also, however, be a kind of shell game
for the consumer because comparison of price and terms would be impossible where the base price is constantly changing. Using Senator
Chafee's example,' 3 9 what customer without a calculator would be able
to quickly determine whether an item offered by merchant A for $340
less a 6% discount or the same item offered by merchant B at $328
with a 4% surcharge would be the better bargain? Allowing both the
surcharge and cash discount would, in this respect, further frustrate
TILA purposes because there would be no common denominator. Imposing a surcharge in lieu of the cash discount would possibly be more
detrimental to the credit customer in terms of higher prices and greater
potential for abuses. If the consumer resists the surcharge, the
merchant may suffer a loss of incremental sales leading to higher prices
136. Hirschman, supra note 120, at 64.
137. Day & Brandt, supra note 30, at 73.
138. See generally supra text accompanying notes 68 & 69, 90.
139. Senate Hearings, supra note 69, at 109-10 (remarks of Sen. Chafee directed to Jim
Boyle, Consumer Federation of America). Boyle responded that consumers would want the cash
discount, and he is quite correct. A less obvious example would be an item at $138 with a 10%
discount or the same item at $118 with a 5% surcharge. In this case the surcharge is the better
bargain. The point here is that with both discounts and surcharges, the rates of which are determined by the individual merchant and vary from one to another, it creates a great deal more
confusion for the customer. Often the choice could be among several merchants.
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for everyone; if the consumer submits to the surcharge, the merchant
may enjoy a windfall.140 Either way, there is no evidence that the cash
paying customer would benefit. In fact, the surcharge may be viewed as
a detriment to the economy in general, particularly in the socioeconomic sense, because it would burden those consumers who rely on
credit for necessary as opposed to luxury goods. Nonetheless, a
surcharge appears to be more consistent with the TILA purposes because it would clearly identify another cost of credit, and would do so
in a manner designed to discourage consumer reliance on credit in general and credit cards in particular. However, in all likelihood, allowing
surcharges would also require some degree of regulation, thus weakening the argument that permitting surcharges would lead to a reduction
of governmental intervention.
Some commentators have compared the concepts of surcharge and
discount to the glass of water which is half-full or half-empty depending on one's perspective. 141 Despite this analogy, Congress chose to promulgate the cash discount in lieu of a surcharge. Title I protects the
cash customer by allowing price reductions in his favor. Title II protects the credit customer by prohibiting price increases. Both titles
work together to assure that a price differential will only be expressed
in one context: discount. Thus, any apparent contradiction to the underlying purpose of TILA can be reconciled by a broad interpretation
of that purpose: to enhance consumers' informed use of credit by calculating the APR and finance charge on a clearly defined regular price
basis. 142 This avoids the shell game effect to the customer, and even
more important, avoids the complex problems that allowing both would
generate with respect to calculating the APR and finance charges in
the absence of a base price. This also acknowledges the broader functions of TILA described earlier, with perhaps a little greater emphasis
on the economic stability function.
V.

THE LITIGATION

As of this writing, there appears to be no reported case law deciding complaints or violations of the provisions of the Cash Discount Act.
This is not altogether surprising for two reasons. First, the relatively
short length of time that these provisions have been in effect, coupled
with the apparent lack of knowledge on the part of the merchant and
consumer and the potentially small individual dollar amounts involved,
make litigation an unlikely alternative for most customers. One might
140.

Id. at 56. 58 (statement of Amy Topiel).

141.

House Hearings, supra note 97, at 6 (statement of Amy Topiel).

142.

Id. at 15.
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speculate that the position taken by consumer watchdog groups such as
Consumers Union (favoring a surcharge) also contributes to the unlikelihood of litigation. 4 ' A second reason for the lack of adjudication may
be that potential violations are decided on other provisions of TILA
and antitrust legislation, specifically the Sherman Act. 44 This observation is based upon a brief review of cases decided prior to enactment of
the Cash Discount Act which dealt with issues such as cash price disclosure in calculation of finance charges,'" third-party creditormerchant contracts,14" and state usury laws.' 4 7 In Joseph v. Norman's
Health Club, Inc.,1 48 the Club sold lifetime memberships primarily on
an installment plan, but sold a few memberships for cash at a discount
of 10%-15% off the total installment price prior to TILA. They also
sold at least four memberships at a discount after the TILA effective
date without disclosing this cash price differential as part of the finance
charge. The promissory notes signed by customers who purchased
memberships on the installment plan stated the finance charge and the
APR as zero.'4 ' The Club had made agreements with several finance
companies whereby a finance company would purchase such notes as it
found to be acceptable, paying the Club the face amount of the note,
less the amount of the negotiated discount provided in the agreement. 150 The district court held that the price reduction allowed to
those members who paid cash after the effective date of TILA was an
undisclosed finance charge imposed on installment customers, but did
not discuss whether the amount discounted on the notes purchased by
the finance companies required disclosure as a finance charge.15 ' The
court of appeals, however, held that the discount paid by the Club on
the notes assigned to the finance companies was required to be included

143. Senate Hearings. supra note 69, at 90-91, 99 (statement of Jim Boyle, Consumer Federation of American and Ellen Broadman, Consumers Union). The surcharge ban is anti-free
enterprise. It puts merchants in a straight-jacket and narrows the marketing approach while affording special interest protection for credit card issuers who do not wish purchasers to know the
true cost of buying on credit. Id. at 90-91.
144. Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
145. Joseph v. Norman's Health Club, Inc., 532 F.2d 86 (8th Cir. 1976), rev'g, 386 F.
Supp. 780 (E.D. Mo. 1974k.
146. O'Driscoll, The American Express Case: Public Good or Monopoly?. 19 J. LAW AND
ECON. 163 (1976) (discussing Blitz v. American Express Co., No. 74-314 (D.D.C. filed Feb. 27,
1974) (withdrawn). Consumers Union was also a plaintiff in this case.
147. State v. J.C. Penney Co., 48 Wis. 125, 179 N.W.2d 641 (1970). For further discussion
of this area, see Comment, Legal Problems of Consumer Credit: Bank Credit Cards and the
Usury Laws. 4 U.C.D. L. REv. 335 (1971).
148. 532 F.2d 86 (8th Cir. 1976), revg 386 F. Supp. 780 (E.D. Mo. 1974).
149. Id. at 88 n.3.
150. Id. at 89. The discount was substantial, ranging from $85 to $165 on notes with a face
value of $360.
151. Id. at 89, 93.
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in the finance charge to the extent this discount was passed on to the
consumer. 52 In the absence of regular or frequent cash sales, the cash
price which should have been disclosed was the amount of cash the
Club received from the finance company after the discounting of the
customer's note.' 53 In State v. J. C. Penney Co.,'" the court found the

1-1/2% monthly charge on the unpaid balance of revolving charge accounts not to be a time price differential; the difference between the
cash price and the credit price amounted to interest governed by the
state's usury statutes. In a suit against the American Express Company, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief under the
Sherman Act because American Express contracted with member
merchants to the effect that the seller would agree the prices charged
to cardholders would not be greater than those charged to other customers.' 5" The suit against American Express had the makings of a
landmark decision, but it was settled out of court with American Express agreeing to permit member merchants to grant cash discounts.'"
In his article discussing this case, Professor O'Driscoll observed that
this contractual provision forbade the granting of discounts to customers willing to pay cash. 15 7 What he neglected to point out was that this
contractual provision forbade the imposition of surcharges as well. At
the time this suit was commenced, TILA required cash discounts to be
disclosed as part of the finance charge. The Fair Credit Billing Act was
also pending in Congress and would have nullified the clause.'" The
clause in question was purportedly a method to preclude merchants
from benefiting from American Express advertising and market segregation and then avoiding payment for these services in the form of
merchant discount fees by inducing the cardholder to pay cash." The
American Express practice was clearly contrary to public and congressional sentiment as evidenced by the subsequent enactment of the Fair
are
Credit Billing Act. Also evident was a belief that cash discounts
6
desirable and might lead to lower prices at the retail level. 0
The absence of litigation is not evidence that there are no violations of the Cash Discount Act, nor does it mean there are no potential

152.
disclosure
at 92.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 93. The finance company was also held liable for failing to make the required
because the finance company was an integral part of the seller's financing program. Id.
Id. at 93 n.14.
48 Wis. 125, 179 N.W.2d 641 (1970).
O'Driscoll, supra note 146, at 163-64.
Id. at 164.
Id. at 163.
Id. at 175 n.21.
Id. at 166-68. See also Murphy & Ott, supra note 106, at 1308-09.
O'Driscoll, supra note 146, at 164.
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issues which might ripen and come before the courts. For example, a
merchant in Xenia, Ohio, recently offered a 10% cash discount in conjunction with a promotional event. It appears that his methods were
approriate, but his motivation was entirely unrelated to the Cash Discount Act. "A merchant in Columbus tried it; it was a huge success. I
thought I would try it too." 16 ' This Xenia businessman admitted that
he had never heard of the Cash Discount Act. Because this merchant
also offers installment credit, a question might arise as to what price he
discloses and what basis he uses for calculating the APR and finance
charge on the installment credit contracts. The Cash Discount Act only
excludes cash discounts from these calculations as applied to open-end
credit. " An even more disconcerting example was recently observed in
Denver, Colorado. A restaurant participating in Carriage Trade, a coupon plan for discounts and "twofers" at area eating establishments, had
a sign posted near the cash register that advised customers of a 10%
charge for credit cards used in conjunction with Carriage Trade coupons. Mr. Irvin Abrams, Chief Investigator, Division of Credit Practices, Federal Trade Commission, confirmed that this was a violation of
the Cash Discount Act.'" While it is permissible for a merchant to
offer a discount in conjunction with a special promotional event, as our
friend in Xenia did, it does not follow that a surcharge can also be
imposed in conjunction with a promotional program.'" The parties involved have been informed that their practices do not comply.
Another example of how merchants are imposing illegal
surcharges involves a New York based mail order stereo equipment distributor. The brochure which this company mails to prospective customers states that "[Credit cards] are accepted. Please add 4% service
charge. ' 165 Personal checks are also accepted, but require a fourteenday clearing period. 1 " The customer is required to pay shipping
charges, but customers outside of New York are not required to pay
sales tax.167 Prices quoted in the brochure are approximately 20% less
than the prices for identical merchandise purchased through local
merchants. While the consumer may not object to paying the 4% ser-

161.

Telephone Interview (Aug. 6, 1982)(memorandum on file at University of Dayton Law

Review).
162. Cash Discount Act § 101.
163. Telephone Interview with Irvin Abrams, Chief Investigator, Division of Credit Practices, Federal Trade Commission (Aug. 31, 1982) (memorandum on file at University of Dayton
Law Review).
164. Id.
165. The Audio Factory, Bayside, N.Y., Summer 1982 Catalog & Price List 5 (relevant
portions on file at University of Dayton Law Review).
166. Id.
167. Id.
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vice charge, and may still net a lower price, this does not make the
surcharge legal. It is an abuse of the consumer who may use credit for
convenience and to assure a more prompt shipment of his order than if
he were to pay by check.
The Cash Discount Act was noted in Melso v. Texaco, Inc.'" Although Melso did not directly involve the Cash Discount Act, it dealt
with the policy questions of cash and credit purchases, the relative costs
of consumer goods, alternative purchasing methods, and the government's role in regulating particular transactions and payment systems.1 69 Melso was a class action brought by Texaco dealers against
the parent company because Texaco implemented a 3% merchant discount fee on the processing of all Texaco credit card receipts. 7 0 The
merchants were denied injunctive relief on their allegations of restraint
of trade and illegal tie-in, unconscionability, improper contract modification, and lack of consideration in an adhesion contract.' 7 , In Melso,
the court discussed subsidy as a foregone conclusion:
Many credit card purchasers in the United States have long received a
subsidy at the expense of those consumers who have been paying cash for
the product. . . .[T]he cash customers, by paying a price made higher
because of the cost of operating7 a credit program, have been subsidizing. . .credit card purchasers.' 2
The Texaco credit program was found to be consistent with the Cash
Discount Act because it attempts to correct this flaw in the credit market.'18 Prior to November 1, 1981, Texaco dealers had no incentive to
offer a cash discount because the processing fee was only $36 annually.
Since the implementation of the 3% processing or discount fee, Texaco
dealers have become acutely aware of the costs related to extending
credit and may, as a result, feel compelled to offer a cash discount in
order to avoid imposing this cost of credit on all customers.174 The fact
that this case did not deal directly with the Cash Discount Act, and
therefore discussion of the Act was unnecessary for the court to decide
the issues, suggests that Judge Broderick's signalizing treatment of the
Act, and particularly the subsidy question, may reflect a degree of subjectivity inconsistent with the judicial function.

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

532 F.Supp. 1280, 1288 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
Id. at 1288.
Id. at 1280.
Id. at 1298.
Id. at 1288.
id. at 1289.
Id. at 1288.
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MORE LEGISLATION?

In February 1982, Congressman Frank Annunzio introduced a
bill1 75 that would amend the Cash Discount Act. The proposed legislation would add another section to the Act, prohibiting a credit card
issuer who is also an oil company franchisor from requiring a seller
who is a franchisee to pay a discount fee to the franchisor for processing credit card receipts when the franchisee honors a credit card issued
by the franchisor.1 7 6 Specifically, this would forbid major oil companies
from imposing a processing or discount fee on dealers for processing
credit card receipts.1 77 This, of course, suggests that the Texaco procedure at issue in Melso may not be consistent with the Cash Discount
Act after all. 176 The reason for this proposed amendment is that dealers
pay for the services provided by the franchisor through the prices paid
for the product. In addition, credit cards have been a marketing device
for the major oil companies to build customer loyalty rather than a per
se credit source.1 7 ' When he introduced this legislation, Rep. Annunzio
said, "[t]he company's credit card is part of that marketing power and
the dealer has paid for it. Imposing a fee on the dealer for honoring the
card would be charging twice for the service. . . .It is to prevent the
double charge of this fee that I introduce this legislation." 1 "
VII.

CONCLUSION

The Cash Discount Act deletes the 5% ceiling on cash discounts
offered by a merchant to induce more customers to pay cash for their
purchases and removes the burdensome Federal Reserve Board regulations concerning disclosure of availability of a cash discount. It also
extends, pending a Federal Reserve Board study, the ban on imposing a
surcharge when a customer uses a credit card. There are also other
non-germane provisions which have not been discussed in this
comment.181

The surcharge ban is the most controversial provision. Senator
Proxmire found it ironic that at a time when politicians were promising
to restrict governmental interference, Congress was busy legislating
175. H.R. 5362, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
176. Id.
177. Gasoline Dealers' Antisurcharge Bill: Hearings on H.R. 5362 Before the Subcomm.
on Consumer Affairs and Coinage of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs.
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (opening statement of Rep. Annunzio) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on
H.R. 5362]. See also Franchising, 43 ANTrTRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1080, at 410
(Sept. 2,1982).
178. See Melso, 532 F. Supp. at 1289. See also supra text accompanying note 173.
179. See Hearings on H.R. 5362, supra note 177, at 3,4.
180. Id.
181. See supra note 2.
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controls on the free enterprise system.1 a ' However, allowing surcharges
may also necessitate some regulation. Although a surcharge may appear to be more consistent with TILA because the cost of credit is not
"hidden" in the price of goods or services, the cash discount results in
less confusion and less opportunity for real or perceived consumer
abuses. The Cash Discount Act is by no means a panacea in today's
sagging economy. It is, however, a viable step in the direction of encouraging consumers to rely less on credit. Congress can encourage
Americans to kick the credit habit with either the proverbial carrot or
stick. The cash discount is a carrot to entice consumers to voluntarily
pay cash more often. A credit surcharge is the stick, inflicting an economic penalty upon those who continue to use credit. If experience
shows in three years that discounts are still the exception to the rule in
the marketplace, Congress may conclude that a surcharge is the only
effective approach to two-tier pricing,1 83 if two-tier pricing is even necessary. However, it seems clear today that the merits of allowing a discount and/or allowing a surcharge is not the end of the discussion.
Ultimately, the success of the Cash Discount Act depends on
awareness and willingness to participate. The merchant must be aware
that he can offer cash discounts and be willing to do so. The consumer
must also be aware that discounts are legal, and must bring pressure on
reluctant merchants through the competitive market forces to offer
them. Similarly, consumers must be aware that surcharges are not legal, and must refuse to patronize merchants who engage in this practice. Without these necessary ingredients, the Cash Discount Act will
have little or no effect in achieving the desired results.
As Congressman Annunzio has suggested, the Cash Discount Act
may be most beneficial as a stabilizing influence in a fluctuating economy. The Cash Discount Act preserves the basic intent, if not the letter, of TILA, while at the same time encouraging more consumers to
pay cash without creating turmoil or penalizing middle income
America. This may be regulation at its best, seeking to accomplish a
legitimate goal in the least burdensome manner.
Betsy Horkovich

182. S. REP. No. 23, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 8-9, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 74, 80-81.
183. See 127 CONG. REC. S2085 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1981) (statement of Sen. Chafe).
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